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Abstract. A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of molinism leads 
to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to 
semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise 
from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to 
molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is 
a  revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by leibniz’s idea 
of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of 
‘possibilistic’ (molinist) complete concepts. They ground middle knowledge 
within the very being of the agents themselves. molinist Complete Concepts 
can thus serve to reject consequence-style arguments against molinism. They 
also allow the molinist to safeguard a robustly libertarian notion of the ability 
to do otherwise.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
The second half of the 20th century saw a renewed interest in molinism. 
As a response, many problems with molinism are eagerly discussed in 
contemporary analytic philosophy, of which the most severe issues are 
the well-known ‘grounding objection’ against middle knowledge and 
the question whether middle knowledge is able to safeguard creaturely 
freedom. In brüntrup/Schneider 2011 we proposed a  version of the 
so-called ‘essence solution’ to the grounding objection, inspired by the 
late molinist school in the 17th century and by leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio 
completa’ (a complete concept) of every possible individual within the 
Divine mind as the truth-maker of its counterfactuals of freedom. In 
this contribution, we will try to provide a refined account of ‘molinist 
Complete Concepts’, defending a  substantially revised version of the 
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original idea against various criticisms. Two key questions are to be 
answered: why complete concepts instead of the conventional essence 
solution? What is the additional theoretical advantage of introducing 
complete concepts as truth-makers of counterfactuals of freedom? How 
could complete concepts serve to clarify the reasons why molinism is 
not to be considered a form of theological determinism – and not even 
a form of compatibilism? We will show (in section 2) that the semantic 
and metaphysical problems for molinism have to be clearly distinguished 
and (in 3 and 4) that the metaphysical problems require a sort of essence 
solution, but that the conventional essence solution has to be revised. 
In section 5 we will explain a precise model of ‘possibilistic’ (molinist) 
complete concepts (5.1) and how it can serve to reject consequence-style 
arguments against molinism, how it allows one to hold the ‘Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities’ (PAP)1 (5.2), and how the relation between these 
complete concepts and the actual individual has to be conceived (5.3).
II. THe mAIN ProblemS oF molINISm
middle knowledge (scientia media) is the eternal Divine knowledge of 
all prevolitional and contingent truths. middle knowledge contains as 
a  subset all the counterfactual conditionals of created freedom (from 
hereon ccfs): (P, C) ❏→ (P, A) or for short C ❏→ A for an individual P, 
circumstances C and a specific decision or action A. molinism is the thesis 
that middle knowledge exists (cf. Perszyk/mares 2011: 96).2 molinism 
is often classified as a  libertarian position whereby libertarianism is 
conceived of as the conjunction of nomological incompatibilism and the 
thesis that we have free will.
Perszyk und mares (2011: 97f.) emphasize that four main problems 
for molinism have to be clearly distinguished:
1 This ‘alternative possibilities condition for free actions’ holds that ‘when an agent does 
something freely she could have done otherwise [under exactly the same circumstances]’ 
(Perszyk/mares 2011: 103).
2 Strictly speaking one has to differentiate between classical Molinism and contemporary 
analytical Molinism. Classical molinism as advocated by molina and his followers argues 
for an a-temporal concept of God; middle knowledge therefore is an eternal knowledge 
in the sense of a-temporal knowledge. In the current debate there are also those who 
advocate a sempiternalist version of molinism, though (cf. Christoph Jäger, ‘molinism 
and Theological Compatibilism’, this volume). In this paper we will presuppose the 
a-temporal version of molinism.
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(a) The semantic problem: What are the truth conditions for the ccfs, 
or what is their semantic foundation? usually this is explicated 
via the possible-worlds semantics of lewis and Stalnaker which 
operates with relative closeness of worlds or class-selection 
functions (cf. lewis 1973; Pollock 1976, 1984; Chellas 1980).
(b) The grounding objection: What are the truth-makers of the ccfs?
(c) The priority problem: The truth values of the ccfs according to 
possible-worlds semantics are dependent upon which world 
is actual – which conflicts with the thesis of their explanatory 
priority and the thesis that true ccfs are guiding principles for 
God’s creative activity (cf. Adams 1977; Kenny 1979: 70: ‘... what 
makes the counterfactual true is not yet there...’). The priority 
problem is closely related to the grounding objection, but still 
distinct from it (the grounding objection remains independent 
from the possible-worlds semantics).
(d) The determinism/compatibilism problem: Does the prevolitional 
truth of the ccfs undermine free will in the libertarian sense?
(b), (c) and (d) are metaphysical problems. Perszyk and mares (2011: 
98) emphasize that solutions to the semantic problem do not carry 
a  metaphysical foundation for molinism with them, and that vice 
versa the metaphysical problems do not pose a  threat to the semantic 
foundation in themselves. In this paper we address only the metaphysical 
problems, especially (b) and (d).
III. VerITAS DeTermINATA
The attempt to extract a  metaphysical foundation for molinism from 
replies to its semantic problems can be exemplarily illustrated by the 
theory of the ‘veritas determinata’ (which dates back to Suárez, cf. ‘De 
scientia Dei’, 1.8.8):
The so-called ‘might-Problem’ leads to the debate concerning 
whether the molinist should either take up the Principle of Conditional 
excluded middle (Cem) or the lewis-Pollock definition (lP) of might-
counterfactuals. Cem states that (C ❏→ A) ∨ (C ❏→ ¬A) for all C and 
A, whereas the lewis-Pollock definition interdefines might- and would-
counterfactuals as follows: (p ◊→ q) =df ¬(p ❏→ ¬q). Since middle 
knowledge contains ccfs, and since proponents of middle knowledge are 
committed to PAP, it seems to follow that:
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(1) C ◊→ A
(2) C ◊→ ¬A
Additionally, for middle knowledge Cem must hold:
(3) either C ❏→ A
(4) or C ❏→ ¬A
but with lP it now follows that:
(5) [(1) ∧ lP] ⊃ ¬(4)
(6) [(2) ∧ lP] ⊃ ¬(3)
(5) and (6) are an unacceptable result for the molinist since they 
undermine the existence of middle knowledge (cf. Hasker 1994: 145). 
Possible ways out of this situation seem to consist in either denying that 
(1) and (2) really follow from a commitment to PAP (cf. Perszyk/mares 
2011: 104, fn. 11) or to reject lP and explicate might-counterfactuals 
in another way. Perszyk and mares show that within lewis-Stalnaker 
semantics, a rejection of lP is not necessary to hold (1) and (2), since the 
evaluation of the truth values of the ccfs via similarity relations is context-
dependent, and Divine and creaturely contexts are to be distinguished 
(cf. Perszyk/mares 2011: 105). The molinist therefore seems able to 
simultaneously hold Cem and lP. but on the basis of lP there is a valid 
objection against Cem posed by lewis (1973: 79-83):
(a) (C ❏→ A) ∨ (C ❏→ ¬A) Cem
(b) ¬(C ❏→ ¬A) ⊃ (C ❏→ A) by (a), and by definition of ⊃
(c) (C ◊→ A) ⊃ (C ❏→ A) by (b), lP
(d) (C ❏→ A) ⊃ (C ◊→ A) obvious (entailed by lP)
(e) (C ◊→ A) ≡ (C ❏→ A) by (c), (d)
If Cem and lP hold simultaneously, the distinction between would- and 
might-counterfactuals collapses (cf. bennett 2006: 189). This consequence 
is unacceptable. Therefore either Cem or lP has to be rejected. There are 
good reasons to reject lP, more precisely speaking to accept ¬[(p ◊→ q) 
⊃ ¬(p ❏→ ¬q)] and – differing from lewis – not to reject Cem (cf. 
Stalnaker 1980; Gaskin 1993; Williams 2010; Jäger, forthcoming).
but if Cem holds for ccfs then both disjuncts (C ❏→ A) and 
(C ❏→ ¬A) cannot be simultaneously false, one of them is true. Since an 
omniscient God by definition knows every truth, he also must know every 
true ccf. This is the veritas-determinata solution to the grounding objection 
as advocated by – among others – Francisco Suárez (cf. Craig 1988: 212).
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IV. THe eSSeNCe SoluTIoN
but this veritas-determinata solution faces serious criticism: Perszyk and 
mares rightly point out – as mentioned before – that solutions to the 
semantic problem do not provide solutions to the metaphysical problems 
of molinism. leibniz already objected against Suárez that even if the ccfs 
are either true or false, the fundamental question remains wherefrom the 
ccfs acquire the definiteness of their truth values (cf. ramelow 1997: 229).
This therefore poses the question of the prerequisites of their being 
true. but how can prevolitional counterfactuals be true? If counterfactuals 
have truth values, it is impossible for these truth values to be verified 
extensionally, since they do not refer to anything in existence and 
therefore do not have any extension. The only possibility remaining is for 
them to be verified intensionally. That is to say, given the counterfactual 
‘If P faces circumstance C, she will freely choose action A’, an insight into 
its truth value can only be acquired via an insight into the concept or the 
essence of P. This is the well-known ‘essence solution’ to the grounding 
objection: God contemplates prior to the act of creation from all eternity 
the individual essences of all possible individuals in all possible worlds 
which contain all possible and factual decisions of the individuals in 
question (cf. Kvanvig 1986: 122-126).
but the essence solution carries a host of further problems in its wake:
(a) The individuation problem: What individuates the essences prior 
to the act of creation? (Cf. Zagzebski 1991: 126.) In the Thomistic 
tradition for example, the essences (forms) are only individuated 
by their merging with the materia quantitate signata. (Cf. ScG, 
II, c. 93; cf. Schneider 2007: 228.) For leibniz though, each such 
essence is an already individuated bundle of qualities without 
trans-world-identity. but this leads to
(b) the problem of superessentialism: If the entities in question are 
individual essences, is it not inevitable that all the qualities of 
these possible individuals belong to them necessarily? (Cf. Gale 
1991: 125-131.)
(c) This poses the problem of determinism: If all its attributes belong 
to an individual necessarily and there is no trans-world identity, 
does that not mean that all its factual decisions are already set 
in such a way as to be determined by its essence? (Cf. langston 
1986: 73 and 91; Hasker 1989: 32, fn. 26.) Does that not make the 
individual ‘a puppet on a string’?
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Subsequently, a consequence-style argument against the essence solution 
can be constructed that runs parallel to the one against standard 
molinism (whereby ‘N’ denotes the No-Choice operator and ‘E’ the 
individual essence):
(CAe)
(1) N(E ∧ C) Premise
(2) ❏[(E ∧ C) → A] Consequence of molinism
(3) NA (1), (2), Transfer of Necessity
This argument can be responded to according to classic strategies: (i) 
by rejecting the Transfer of Necessity Principle (the ‘β-rule’) or (ii) by 
rejection of premise (1), i.e. by ascribing a ‘counterfactual power’ over my 
essence and God’s knowledge of it. but strategy (i) brings up the question 
whether this does not entail the fall of the classic consequence-argument 
against nomological (causal) compatibilism – which the molinist as 
a libertarian does not necessarily have to endorse, but rejecting it would 
certainly be disadvantageous for him.3 With regard to strategy (ii) one 
can state that molina himself explicitly conceived of a  counterfactual 
power over the middle knowledge.4 but this raises the question how this 
counterfactual power is to be understood: is it only a  ‘weak ability’ in 
the lewisian sense (cf. lewis 1981) or a direct power over God’s middle 
knowledge? And what is the difference between counterfactual power 
over God’s knowledge and counterfactual power over the past and the 
laws of nature in the case of nomological compatibilism?
but this debate cannot be pursued here, we will follow another path: 
In our opinion, on the one hand, one needs intensional verifiability of 
the ccfs and thus a  form of essence solution, but on the other hand, 
the conventional essence solution has to be revised. In the following 
section a  model shall be developed, which is guided by leibniz and 
the late-molinistic debate. It provides specific answers to the problems 
listed above.
3 Cf. Jäger 2011: 258f. Jäger argues that within the nomological consequence-
argument and within the anti-molinistic consequence argument there are at work two 
different transfer-principles, so that the molinist can reject the one and stick to the other.
4 Cf. Concordia 4.52.21: middle knowledge ‘would be different in God, as is possible, 
created free choice were by its innate freedom going to turn itself to the opposite part’ 
(‘aliter se haberet in Deo, si liberum arbitrium creatum pro sua innata libertate, ut potest, 
in oppositam partem foret inflectendum’, trl. by A. J. Freddoso). Cf. also Concordia 
4.52.10, 30, 32, 34.
99ComPleTe CoNCePT molINISm
V. molINIST ComPleTe CoNCePTS
5.1 Complete Concepts as Functions
As early as in the scholastic debate in the time between molina (1535-1600) 
and leibniz (1646-1716) the idea originated that middle knowledge was 
to be founded upon a complete representation of all possible individuals 
within the Divine mind. A relevant passage for this idea can be found 
in the writings of the molinist Hieronymus Fasolus, S.J. (1568-1639), 
who refined molina’s concept of ‘divine supercomprehension’, i. e. of the 
infinite power of representation of the Divine essence toward a complete 
comprehension of individual substances (cf. ramelow 1997: 228):
In the spirit of molina [...] the free cause cannot be known in a perfect 
manner if there is not also knowledge of everything contained within 
this cause, as well as everything that can possibly be caused by it, what 
has been caused by it, will be caused by it and would be caused by it; 
for the effects too, and indeed all these effects, stem from the cause; so 
he who perfectly knows the cause necessarily also knows those effects 
that depend on it in any respect whatsoever [...]. but it is evident that 
this perfect knowledge must be infinite regarding the future effects (In 
primum partem Summae D. Thomae Commentariorum, T.2, lyon 1629: 
269a; transl. by authors. Cf. Knebel 1991: 3).5
even though leibniz himself rejected the concept of a middle knowledge, 
it can nevertheless be shown that his idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete 
concept) of an individual arose within the context of the molinistic-
Thomistic debate, and has ultimately a strong affinity with the molinistic 
position (cf. Hübener 1988: 114; ramelow 1997: 401-419). His intuition 
regarding the Divine knowledge of future contingent actions is in line 
with the remarks of Fasolus:
God preserves our being and continually generates it, namely in such 
a way that we encounter thoughts spontaneously or freely in that order 
which is carried by the concept of our individual substance and in which 
5 ‘mente molinae [...] causa libera [...] non potest perfectissimo modo obiective 
cognosci, nisi simul cognoscantur et omnia, quae sunt in causa, et praeterea omnia quae 
ex causa vel esse possunt, vel erunt, vel sunt, vel fuerunt, vel essent; nam effectus etiam, 
atque adeo omnes isti effectus, sunt aliquid causae; ergo qui cognoscit perfectissimo 
modo causam, eius etiam effectus, quavis ratione ab ea pendentes, cognoscat necesse 
est [...]. Quod autem haec perfectissima cognitio respectu effectuum futurorum esse 
debeat infinita, patet.’
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it could be foreseen from all eternity (Discours de métaphysique, § 30; 
transl. by authors; emphasis added).
In his letters to de Volder, leibniz elaborates further that the complete 
concept of an individual has to be thought of as a function (leibniz uses 
the term ‘series’ [seria]).6 This train of thought can serve as a systematic 
and historical background for the following model (cf. brüntrup/
Schneider 2011: 234f.):
Definition. let I be a set of indices, let U be a set of possible conditions 
Ck∈ U, k∈ I, let A be a set of possible actions or decisions of an individual 
P, and M a set of subsets of A: {Ai : i ∈ I} ⊆ A, {Ai : i ∈ I}∈ M. In this case 
the following reconstruction holds:
(1) by virtue of his Scientia naturalis, God contemplates which sets of 
actions are coherent with which conditions, formulated as a function FP 
from U to M:
FP : U → M,
FP(Ck) = {Ai : i ∈ I} =: MCk∈ M
(Conditions of coherence)
The individual to be created should be free, therefore several choices 
among actions coherent with respect to conditions U are available for it. 
Formally, it can avail itself of several choice-functions
ch: M → A.
These choice-functions have sets as arguments and one element of the 
respective arguments as value:
ch({Ai : i ∈ I}) = AC
where AC∈ {Ai : i ∈ I}
The individual P has a set of choice-functions CH at its disposal (ch∈ CH): 
in the strict logical sense there are several free choices consistent with 
the single circumstances and the individual’s complete concept.
(2) by His scientia media, God knows which specific choice-function the 
individual to be created is going to select. God knows not only the family 
6 Cf. among others his letter to de Volder dating march 24th / April 3rd 1699 (leibniz, 
Hauptschriften, bd. II: 475), in which leibniz says of the soul: ‘Denn deren Natur besteht 
doch darin, das dauernde Gesetz für eine fortlaufende reihe von Veränderungen zu bilden, 
die sie ohne Anstoß durchläuft’ [‘For does not her nature consist in forming the law for 
a continuous series of changes without her passing through any impetus’], as well as the 
letter to de Volder from January 21st 1704 (leibniz, Hauptschriften, bd. II: 513–518).
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of choice-functions CH available to P, but also which one the individual 
would select, He knows:
ch*∈ CH,
ch*({Ai : i ∈ I}) = AC*
where AC*∈ {Ai : i ∈ I}
Thus: [ch*({Ai : i ∈ I}) = AC*] ⇔ [Ck ❏→ AC*].
(3) by virtue of his scientia libera, God now knows the concrete factual 
evaluation of the composition
SP* := ch* ○ FP : U → A
at the position of the created circumstance Ck* (whereby the evaluation 
for all possible worlds is already contained within the scientia media):
ch*(FP(Ck*)) = AC*
The first component is the choice of the free actor, the second component 
indicates which choices and actions are coherent with the corresponding 
circumstances (within a  coherent framework, i.e. a  ‘feasible world’).7 
These functions are the truth-makers for the ccfs demanded by the 
grounding objection. They are the medium of knowledge (medium 
quo) by which God contemplates the ccfs, and they are pre-volitional, 
i.e. not caused by an act of Divine will. They do not, however, represent 
Platonic entities independent of the Divine intellect, but rather ideas 
or pre-existent8 concepts in the Divine mind which are ontologically 
dependent upon it. of course, it has to be taken into account that distinct 
concepts within the Divine mind may only be interpreted modo nostro 
concipiendi (according to our mode of understanding): God does not 
think sequentially in distinct propositions, but contemplates these 
complete concepts with one intellectual vision.
5.2 Determinism, Uniqueness and Law-Likeness
However a consequence-style argument against this model of molinist 
Complete Concepts (mCCs) can also be formulated, simply by 
exchanging E with mCC in the original argument directed against the 
essence solution CAe:
7 Cf. Flint 1998, 51-54.
8 The late-scholastic Jesuit Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) already formulated the idea of 
an intentionally pre-existing futuritio formalis for the ccfs (cf. ramelow 1997, 222-230).
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(CAmCC)
(1) N(mCC ∧ Ck*) Premise
(2) ❏[mCC ∧ Ck*) → AC*] Consequence of molinism
(3) NAC* (1), (2), Transfer of Necessity
but here, in the case of mCC, there are notable differences from the 
earlier argument directed against the essence solution. This can best be 
demonstrated by providing a graph:
If one ascribes to every circumstance Ck∈ U a time-index tck, it has 
the effect that the complete concept of an individual P can be depicted as 
a bundle of curves.
W4
W3
W2
W1
W0
R
A
A1
Am
Am+l
An
Mc0
tc0
Mc1
tc1
Mck−1
tck−1 tck
Mc0+c1
tc0 + tc1
So to every point of time belonging to a circumstance, a set of possible 
actions A  (restricted by the conditions of coherence) is assigned. 
W1, ...,  Wn present closed world-courses of P (this does not require the 
physical world to be closed deterministically and causally; an interaction 
between the mental and the physical dimension remains possible). 
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A  given mCC therefore contains the whole spectrum of possibilities 
for P. This is the key difference compared to a deterministic ‘leibnizian 
Complete Concept’ (lCC) which would allow for one world-course only. 
The course represented by the thick black line is the actual world-course 
of P as known by middle knowledge. In the literature this is customarily 
called the ‘thin red line’ (Trl), we will follow this convention (cf. restall 
2011). It exhibits discontinuities which are due to the free actions of P 
(it is also possible that P remains on the smooth sections of the graphs, 
which again results from free decisions of P).
Absolutely central for our argument is the following distinction: the 
Trl within a given mCC is on the one hand unambiguous and is known 
by God as an unambiguous course, but due to the points of discontinuity, 
the Trl is missing an essential ingredient to be classified as deterministic: it 
does not follow a law-like propagation. but for determinism to hold, more 
than unambiguousness is required. We define determinism as follows:
Definition. A world-course is deterministic if and only if
(1) this course is unambiguous (unique) and
(2) is law-like, i.e. a  law determines that an individual, once set on 
a world-course, can no longer leave it. In the picture above this means: 
The graph Φ: R × A → A describes a path with
Φ(0, A0) = A0,
Φ(t, A0) = At and
Φ(t+r, A0) = Φ(r, Φ(t, A0)) = Φ(r, At).
Thus, if there is a t ∈ R with Φ(r, At) = Φ(r, At′), for given actions At and 
At′, then At = At′ holds.9
lawlike propagation therefore means that an individual moves forward 
on its world-course without the possibility of leaving it. If the individual 
P has once entered the state A0, it is determined on which world course it 
resides and with this all its positions are set for every point of time.
So determinism entails both unambiguousness as well as lawlike 
propagation of a  world-course. unambiguousness in itself is not 
sufficient for the presence of a deterministic process. lawlike propagation 
implies unambiguousness, but unambiguousness does not imply law-
likeness (cf. Schneider 2009: 130-134). our model does not obey any 
lawlike propagation due to the possibility of discontinuities. The Trl 
9 We owe this clarification to Christina Schneider. Cf. Schneider, ‘Agent-Causation 
and Paradigms for God’s Knowledge’, this volume.
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is unambiguous but not deterministic. The mCCs are non-algorithmic: 
There is no algorithm or inner law unfolding through the mCC. The 
unambiguousness of Trl is fully sufficient for the infallibility of Divine 
foreknowledge; an additional lawlike structure is unnecessary.
With this, the consequence argument against mCCs becomes 
vulnerable: it is not possible to deduce the Trl from the mCCs. Thus, 
step (2) in CAmCC is rejected, namely ❏[(mCC ∧ C) → A]. There is no 
necessary inferential connection, or respectively no set of premises and 
no system of rules, from which the decision or action of the individual 
in question could be deduced with necessity. The only thing that would 
be truly deducible is the possibility of a certain action (specified for P): 
├ (mCC ∧ C) → ◊PA. This has significant ramifications for the ability 
to do otherwise: while lCCs destroy the ability to do otherwise due to 
their lack of transworld-identity, this does not hold for mCCs.10 It is 
the very idea of an mCC that it has a  plurality of world-courses built 
in. Furthermore, within the framework of the lewis-Stalnaker semantics 
it holds that the similarity relations relevant for the verification of ccfs 
are highly context-dependent (cf. bennett 2006: 179f.). obviously, ‘God’s 
context’ and the contexts of free creatures are fundamentally different (cf. 
Perszyk/mares 2011: 104f.). This insight can be spelled out metaphysically 
with aid of the mCCs. Given a true ccf C ❏→ A, in the ‘context of God’ it 
is not metaphysically possible that C ❏→ ¬A. However, in the context of 
the created individual this is quite possible: while there is an unambiguous 
Trl within the mCC in ‘God’s context’, the future in the context of a free 
individual is causally and alethically open. This would not be possible 
if the Trl in God’s context contained a  lawlike propagation, or if it 
were the unfolding of an algorithmic process in addition to the Trl’s 
unambiguousness, for this very unfolding would take place necessarily, 
i.e. in every possible world in which the individual could be found.
5.3 The Relation Between an MCC and the Subject
The claim that the free individual is not a puppet of its mCC requires 
a clarification of the relation between mCC and the individual (situated 
in a  created world). As mentioned before, the mCCs are not Platonic 
entities of which the created individual is merely a ‘shadow’. The mCCs 
are rather concepts in the Divine mind and thus ontologically dependent 
10 Also the counterfactual power explicitly conceded by molina implies the ability to 
do otherwise (cf. Perszyk/mares 2011: 103, fn. 10).
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upon it. mCCs (in their ontological status) might be conceived of as 
forms in the Thomistic sense – a forma substantialis cannot claim any 
autonomy prior to creation and prior to the existence of the matter 
assigned to it. The forma substantialis is not a ‘homunculus’ within the 
created individual, governing the individual like a puppet on a string – 
neither is the mCC. Thus the idea that I am determined by my mCC 
makes as little sense as the idea that I  am determined by my forma 
substantialis. There is no independent and ready-made ‘I’ which could 
then be controlled by the mCC.
Furthermore, we think mCCs might best be situated within an 
atemporal-eternalistic framework.11 If this is assumed, one cannot 
implicitly adopt the sempiternalist assumption, according to which 
mCCs have ‘already existed’ for an infinite time, and then are governing 
the course of the history of an individual in time. It is a daunting task to 
adequately explain the concept of eternity, a task we cannot adequately 
tackle here. At this point it might suffice to claim that the mCCs represent 
the abundance of the possible self-realisation-process of an individual. 
They are the ‘complete form’ of the individual by virtue of which it can 
unfold itself free from determination, both from without and from 
within. The free actions of a created individual are radically up to the 
individual itself – it causes its own actions. by virtue of its ‘complete 
form’ it accomplishes its own acts and thereby realizes itself.
VI. SummArY
We have seen that a  theoretically rigorous approach to the various 
problems of molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and 
metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide 
answers to the metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of 
middle knowledge (Perszyk/mares 2011: 98). The attempt to solve the 
grounding objection by referring to semantic principles (such as Cem) 
is inadequate. The question of the prerequisites of the verification of the 
ccfs requires a metaphysical answer. The only way to verify prevolitionally 
given ccfs is to verify them intensionally, i.e. by an insight into the essence 
of possible individuals. but this ‘essence solution’ creates new problems, 
like the problem of superessentialism. A  consequence-style argument 
11 molina himself explicitly defends the Thomistic atemporal eternalism in Concordia, 
disp. 48: 2 and 10ff. (cf. Jäger, ‘molinism and Theological Compatibilism’, this volume).
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against the essence solution can be construed which runs parallel to 
the consequence-style arguments against Standard-molinism. The 
new model here suggested states that there exist ‘possibilistic’ complete 
concepts instead of essences within the Divine mind, which are the 
medium quo of Divine knowledge, ontologically dependent upon it. We 
have shown that this does not imply leibnizian superessentialism. These 
‘molinist Complete Concepts’ are represented by composed choice-
functions, which contain the whole spectrum of possible world-courses 
of the respective individual. by virtue of His middle knowledge, God 
contemplates a  unique ‘thin red line’ (Trl) of factual choices among 
these possible world-courses, but this Trl is not a deterministic course. 
Determinism requires both uniqueness of a  world-course and a  law-
like propagation. Within the proposed mathematical model it can be 
demonstrated that the unambiguousness of the Trl does not imply law-
likeness. The molinist Complete Concepts do not describe algorithmic 
automata. Humans are not reduced to automata. The individual is not 
a ‘puppet on a string’ of an inner law determined by its complete concept. 
The relevant consequence-style argument against this form of molinism 
can thus be rejected. There is no necessary inferential connection 
between the complete concept and the decisions of an individual.
In addition, this account of molinism provides an argument for the 
claim that within God’s context there can be a unique Trl, while in the 
context of the respective created individual its future is open. A molinism 
that solves the grounding objection almost inevitably produces a tension 
with free will. Whatever grounds middle knowledge is prior to human 
free choice. our model dissolves this worry. molinist Complete Concepts 
ground middle knowledge within the very being of the agent herself. It 
even makes perfect sense to claim that, while the future is open from 
a human point of view, it is accessible to Divine understanding. If the 
latter fact is considered a  threat to human free will for independent 
reasons, then open Theism may be the only choice for the libertarian. 
our model, however, provides an understanding of molinism that does 
not eschew spelling out the metaphysics of the theory. We do not take the 
truth of the counterfactuals of freedom as inexplicable basic facts. Still, 
we preserve a rather robust conception of libertarian freedom within the 
molinist framework.12
12 Acknowledgment: This paper was originally presented in munich, at a conference 
for the Analytic Theology Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation.
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